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Abstract                                                                                                          
 
In this article, the authors look into the theological background of the support that nation-
states in the Western Balkans received during their formation at the end of the 20th century. 
Although many articles were written on the causes of the wars for national independence, and 
on the relationship between religious narratives and ethnic exclusion, very few were written 
on the theological support of the ethnic exclusion. The authors show that the roots of making 
ethnos and affiliation with certain nations in Eastern Europe can be found in the writings of 
late Pope John Paul II and Serbian Orthodox Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović. By analyzing their 
writings in which they turned ethnic and national affiliation into a religious value, the authors 
shed new light on the rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe, which is tightly connected to 
theological discourse. 
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1. The Effects of Sacralization of Ethnonationalist Agendas 
Scene 1 
It is August 1995. In this extremely hot month in the Balkans, Croatia is celebrating 
the reclaiming of the areas that were under siege for years.1 This victory after a war, in which 
a third of Croatia was under occupation by Serbian paramilitary units and the Yugoslavian 
National Army, was made possible by an expeditious battle led by the Croatian Army in the 
areas of Central and South Croatia. The battle, called Operation Storm, was completed on 
August 7 with the liberation of Knin, the capital of the Serbian territorial unit called The 
Republic of Serbian Krajina—formed in 1991. This territory was a home to Serbs who had 
settled there during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to serve as keepers of the border with 
the Ottoman Empire. As Knin was reclaimed by the Croatian Army, hundreds of thousands of 
Serbs, former soldiers, old people, women, and children were walking in endless lines and 
some were travelling by tractors towards the Republic of Serbia, careful not to cross over to 
Bosnian territory, where at the time, war was raging. To celebrate the victory, Croatian state 
officials and a number of Church dignitaries, headed by the then president Franjo Tuđman, 
organized the so-called Freedom Train, which took them from Zagreb all the way to Split on 
August 26. This all took place only three weeks after the liberation of occupied Croatian 
areas, three weeks after the exodus of thousands of people of Serbian nationality from areas 
that were under occupation, and only a couple of days after the crimes Croatian soldiers 
committed against 361 Serbian old people and women, who decided to stay on their 
properties following Tuđman's propaganda that those who stay would suffer no harm.2  
        At the Knin railway station, Tuđman gave a speech in which he, among other things, 
stated that the Serbs who had fled Serbian Krajina during and after the Operation Storm, 
“didn't even have time to collect their dirty money and their dirty underwear.”3 
Right behind Tuđman stood dignitaries of the Catholic Church in Croatia. They participated 
in the whole event and in the voyage of the Freedom Train. The presence of dignitaries of the 
Catholic Church in Croatia at this event meant that, finally, the Croatian “centuries-old 
dream” came true, though covered in blood and crimes that took place around that time. The 
                                                          
1 Croatia restored its full territorial integrity in 1998 through peaceful re-integration of the eastern part of 
Croatia. 
2 Croatian NGO Documenta extensively documented the crimes at https://www.documenta.hr/en/vra-oluja-24-
godine-poslije.html. 
3 See full speech at https://hr.wikisource.org/wiki/Govor_Franje_Tuđmana_u_Kninu_26._kolovoza_1995. 
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Croatian Bishops' Conference, as well as Cardinal Franjo Kuharić, condemned the crimes and 
called for forgiveness, inviting the Serbian people not to leave their homes. At the same time, 
Serbian refugees on their tractors and wasted cars arrived at their final destinations in Serbia, 
hoping that their “home country” would provide shelter, food, and safety. 
 
Scene 2  
It is the year 1991, the end of autumn. Endless lines of men, women, children and old 
men carrying bags are walking down the streets of a city almost completely destroyed by 
recent bombings. The city is Vukovar, situated at the very border with Serbia. From August 
1991 to November 18, 1991, the city was under continuous shelling by the Yugoslav National 
Army and Serbian paramilitary units.4 Images of the city destroyed and lines of refugees as 
well as wounded soldiers being taken from the Vukovar Hospital to be executed on the site of 
a mass grave, Ovčara, deeply disturbed the international public, which recognized Croatia's 
independence only two months later. 
The famous Serbian publicist and intellectual Mirko Đorđević tells us more about the 
atmosphere in Serbia in those days: 
I remember one such incident, Vukovar was totally destroyed, it was horror, it looked 
like, as you may well know, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not a stone was left standing, it 
was done by Yugoslavian National Army. Edition of Pravoslavlje (“Orthodoxy”)5 
came out and I met the chief editor in the street. “Well,” I tell him, “there is not a 
word in Pravoslavlje about what took place in Vukovar.” “Take a closer look,” he 
tells me, “we do mention it.” “Well then, I must read it closely, I've only just bought 
the issue.” On that day, in Pravoslavlje it was said that the children of Vukovar now 
breathe in  
joy and happiness for they have finally been liberated. 
 
Đorđević goes on to say: 
Believe it or not, we can now safely say, and it has been backed up by evidence that 
the Church participated in the war and in that sense, those who claim it do not 
exaggerate much, was a sort of a war profiteer, although it all ended badly… But the 
worst thing was that our Church did not take a good stand towards the whole thing, so 
that the suffering that our people have endured in Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia and 
Slavonia fall into oblivion in the face of our indifference towards the suffering of 
others.6  
 
                                                          
4 It is estimated that 1800-2000 defenders and around 30000 attackers participated in the battle of Vukovar. 
Around 1000 defenders and around 8000 attackers were killed. See https://www.24sata.hr/news/vukovar-
najveca-tragedija-hrvatskog-naroda-u-brojkama-447403. 
5 Pravoslavlje is an official journal of Serbian Patriarchy in Belgrade. 
6 On Đorđević's statements see https://pescanik.net/zasto-se-u-crkvi-sapuce-2/. 
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Every year, on August 5, Croatia remembers Operation Storm in Knin with huge celebrations 
and a solemn mass. Every year, on August 5, Serbia mourns ethnic cleansing of its people, 
with an obligatory parastos (memorial service) for Serbian victims.7 Croatian bishopric refers 
to the Operation Storm as the final realization of the Croatian dream, whereas Serbian 
bishopric calls it a crime.8 Croatian bishopric places Vukovar in the context of Croatian 
victimhood, while Serbian bishopric speaks of it as a Serbian victimhood. The contradictory 
representations of Vukovar and Operation Storm can certainly be seen as a case study of 
unreconciled and conflicting memories in which religious imagery played an important role. 
The influence of religious imagery on the culture of memory is hardly a novelty not 
only in theological but also in cultural research. We are attempting to shed some light on the 
causes and sources of the support Croatian and Serbian clergy offered to the respective state's 
politics. Many articles have been written on this topic, from the ones that deal with ‘atavistic, 
centuries-old hatred,’ or with the relationship between the religious and the national, which 
played an important role in the Balkan Wars in the 1990s.9 However, very few, if any, tackle 
the theological background of the support, so amply provided by religious institutions in the 
process of making the nation-states in the Balkans.10 This paper deals with theological 
support dominant Christian communities provided in the making of nation-states, as well as 
the role this support played on notions, such as a people, ethnicity, and the Christian faith. In 
Croatia and Serbia, as well as Eastern Europe, these notions are of recent origin, dating from 
the end of the1970s onwards, and their beginning can be traced to encyclical letters by Pope 
John Paul II and the theological interpretation of Orthodox Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović. In 
the context of former Yugoslavia, the consequences of transforming the concept of a people 
as ethnos into a theological category have yet to be adequately explored. These consequences 
stretch from the narrative used by religious communities to strengthen ethnonationalist 
                                                          
7 On memory culture of Operation Storm, see Gordana Đerić “Semantika ćutanja” in Intima javnosti, ed. 
Gordana Đerić (Beograd: Fabrika knjiga, 2008). 
8 See for example the statement of the Serbian Patriarch Irinej who stated that “Operation Storm was an 
organized crime by Croatian state, with tacit approval of the Croatian Catholic Church.” 
https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/patrijah-irinej-oluja-je-bila-zlocin-koji-je-planirala-hrvatska-drzava-foto-
20190805. 
9 See for example recent research on the role of religious leaders in the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Stipe 
Odak, Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding: The Role of Religious Leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina (New 
York: Springer, 2020). 
10 Many authors (e.g. Tomislav Tomasevich, Ivo Banac, Paul Mojzes, Vjekoslav Perica, Srećko Džaja, Darko 
Hudelist, Pål Kolstø, Boris Buden, Slavica Jakelić, Dejan Jović, Snježana Kordić, Mitja Velikonja, Davor 
Džalto, Srđa Popović, Ivan Pađen, Srđan Vrcan, Siniša Malešević, Željko Mardešić, Hijancid Bošković, Ivan 
Macut, Zvonimir Bono-Šagi, Luka Vincetić, Stipe Odak and the like.), whether through historical, cultural, 
legal, sociological, philosophical, theological or some other aspect have dealt with the topic of religious and 
national issues in the former Yugoslavia, whose work we are familiar with, but due to lack of space, we will 
mention only a few of them who are essential for the purposes of this paper. 
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narratives of political communities all the way to the influence they had on the way collective 
memories of the main traumatic episodes in the recent war were built. This is a consequence 
of both understanding the ethnic and national aspect in primordial and perennial frameworks 
as two concepts that prevail in the social consciousness in the former Yugoslavia—especially 
in the Croatian and Serbian case—and understanding the church institution as a constitutive 
ethnic and national element.11 In other words, we shall attempt to shed some light on the fact 
that although dominant theologians and the Catholic and Orthodox Church dignitaries 
respectively advocated forgiveness and condemned violence, they did so within a pre-
established ethnic-national matrix, which was embodied in already formed nation-states, the 
matrix which began with the position of ethnicity, intertwining its religious narrative with the 
ethnic one. 
 
2. The Causes of Sacralization of Ethnonationalist Agendas 
2.1. John Paul II and the Theology of Nation 
Within the Catholic theology, John Paul II made a key step towards a theological 
appreciation of the notion of (ethnically understood) people, which had a significant 
influence on the conceptualization of the relationship between religious and national 
affiliation in Eastern Europe, especially among peoples without a sovereign state. 
Originating from Poland, with its rich history of the struggle for independence with Germany 
and Russia, in his encyclicals, and in his book, Memory and Identity, published in 2005, Pope 
                                                          
11 See Duško Sekulić, “Građanski i etnički identitet: Slučaj Hrvatske [Civic and Ethnic Identity: The Case of 
Croatia]”, Politička misao 40, 2 (2004): 145–51.; Jasna Milošević-Đorđević, “Primordijalističko značenje 
nacionalnog identiteta u Srbiji [Primordialistic Concept of National Identity in Serbia]”, Psihologija 40, 3 
(2007): 385–97.; Srđan Vrcan, Nacija, nacionalizam, moderna država [Nation, Nationalism and Modern State] 
(Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2006), 123.; Neven Budak, “Hrvatski identitet i povijest [Croatian 
Identity and History]”, in Identitet kao odgojno-obrazovna vrjednota [Educational activity and values], ed. 
Valentina Blaženka Mandarić i Ružica Razum (Zagreb: Glas koncila, 2011), 105–20.; Neven Budak, “Hrvatski 
identitet između prošlosti i moderniteta [Croatian Identity between the Past and the Modernity]”, in Hrvatski 
nacionalni identitet u globalizirajućem svijetu [Croatian National Identity in the Globalizing World], ed. Neven 
Budak i Vjeran Katunarić (Zagreb: Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo-Pravni fakultet, 2010), 3–4, 10.; 
Petar Korunić, Rasprava o izgradnji moderne hrvatske nacije: Nacija i nacionalni identitet [A Discussion on the 
Development of Modern Croatian Nation: Nation and National Identity] (Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski institut za 
povijest, Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, 2006), 209, 271., 351-352, 376; Mate Suić, 
“Pristupna razmatranja uz problem etnogeneze Hrvata [Access Considerations Related to the Problem of 
Ethnogenesis of Croats]”, in Etnogeneza Hrvata [Ethnogenesis of Croats], ed. Neven Budak (Zagreb: Nakladni 
zavod Matice Hrvatske i Zavod za hrvatsku povijest-Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1995), 16.; 
Sima Ćirković, “Srednjovjekovno razdoblje u tzv. etnogenezi balkanskih naroda [Medieval Period in the so-
called Ethnogenesis of the Balkan Peoples]”, in Etnogeneza Hrvata [Ethnogenesis of Croats], ed. Neven Budak 
(Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice Hrvatske i Zavod za hrvatsku povijest-Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu, 1995), 35–36.; Ivo Žanić, “Simbolični identitet Hrvatske u trokutu: raskrižje-predziđe-most [Symbolic 
Identity of Croatia in the Triangle: Crossroad-Bulwark-Bridge]”, in Historijski mitovi na Balkanu [Historical 
Myths in the Balkans], ed. Husnija Kamberović (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 2003), 196. 
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John Paul II's theology of people certainly reflects the history of the Polish people throughout 
the centuries. Along with the aforementioned book, this Pope built his theology of people in 
encyclicals, which we will briefly touch upon. Special attention will be given to the following 
encyclicals:  Redemptor Hominis (1979), Laborem Exercens (1981), Redemptoris Mater 
(1987), Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987) and finally Centesimus Annus (1991). 
The problem of the relationship between nature and supernature, that goes back to 
Thomas Aquinas’ theology, with John Paul II gains its communitarian dimension, where that 
which is particular (human nature) gains its theological dimension. Individual human nature 
is no longer solely seen as redeemed and complemented by grace, but also, the Polish Pope 
tells us, it is reinterpreted as being social. In other words, one's personal fulfillment is to be 
found in relationships which are not part of one's accidental properties, but of one's essence. 
But, the question arises: which relationships are essential to one's nature? From the point of 
view of biology, the first socialization takes place in one's immediate family. The theology of 
John Paul II is positioned between nature and grace, and is, in our opinion, the most elaborate 
representation of assigning theological importance to biological givens, which he no longer 
limits to immediate family, but spreads to culture, and therefore to one's nationality. On the 
other hand, he uses the universality of the Church as a corrective in lifting the particularity of 
natural givens to the level of the absolute. It is important to note that, although he stresses the 
inalienability of an individual's dignity and, referring to Second Vatican Council, 
“transcendence of the human person”12 which cannot be reduced to natural particularities, 
John Paul II holds that one's dignity itself is inseparable from one's culture and nationality. 
The Pope opens his encyclical letter Redemptor hominis with the notion of the nature of 
Incarnation where “the Son of God in a certain way united himself with each man”13 and so 
“what is in question here is man in all his truth, in his full magnitude. We are not dealing here 
with the 'abstract' man, but the real, 'concrete', 'historical' man.”14 This Incarnation into a real, 
historical person, serves John Paul II as the foundation for his argument that a person is 
embodied with all the important elements comprising of “… his personal being and also of 
his community and his social being in the sphere of his own family… in the sphere of his 
own nation or people… in the sphere of the whole mankind,” whereas these elements are 
determined as “the primary route that the Church must travel in fulfilling her mission; he is 
the primary and fundamental way for the Church, the way traced out by Christ himself, the 
                                                          
12 John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis.html 
13 John Paul II, Redemptor, §8. 
14 John Paul II, Redemptor, §13. 
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way that leads invariably through the mystery of the Incarnation and the Redemption.”15 By 
transforming the elements such as family, society, and nationality into the categories that 
constitute the nature of Incarnation itself, John Paul II assigned theological significance to all 
the above mentioned identity markers, and in that way outlined a theology we shall name 
ethno-theology. He elaborates these insights in his encyclicals to come.  
       In Laborem exercens (1981) he bases human labor on family “one of the most important 
terms of reference for shaping the social and ethical order of human work.” Family is “the 
first school of work, within the home, for every person.” 16  But, in the next instant, the Pope 
places the subject of labor, the human, into a wider community, that of “great society to 
which man belongs on the basis of particular cultural and historical links,” the society whose 
values “make up the culture of a given nation.” By associating the values that comprise the 
wider community of a human with nation, the Pope makes perhaps even the most important 
claim within his theological assessment of temporal identities. This claim has to do with the 
idea that “man combines his deepest human identity with membership of a nation.”17  This 
sentence may well be the most articulate theological evaluation of human nature which he, 
within the context of social nature of human, does not only associate with one's family, i.e., 
one's biological connections. With this evaluation of the nation, the Pope also transforms the 
qualities that make a nation into a spiritual dimension pertinent to human being. This 
dimension is a part of one's core identity in need of salvation.  
Along these lines, in  Solicitudo Rei Socialis from 1987, speaking about the 
Declaration on Human Rights  and the principles of human rights and dignity, he takes the 
notion of dignity and applies it to nations and peoples “as entities having a specific cultural 
identity, are particularly sensitive to the preservation, free exercise and promotion of their 
precious heritage.“18 Because people and nation are the core components of an individual, 
who has the inalienable dignity and rights, the Pope goes on to say that: “Peoples or nations 
too have a right to their own full development, which, while including the economic and 
social aspects, should also include individual cultural identity and openness to the 
transcendent.”19 
       Centesimus Annus from 1991 calls for our special attention. Written right after the 
                                                          
15 John Paul II, Redemptor, §14. 
16 John Paul II, Laborem exercens, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens.html, §10. 
17 John Paul, Laborem, §10. 
18 John Paul II, Solicitudo Rei Socialis, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis.html, §26. 
19 John Paul, Solicitudo, §32. 
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breakup of the Communist regime and the birth of nation-states in the East and East-West of 
Europe, in it the Pope elaborates on the relationship of cultural, national, and personal 
identity with the state's role. In the chapter “State and Culture” he condemns the totalitarian 
character mainly of communist states which aim to “absorb within itself the nation, society, 
the family, religious groups and individuals themselves.”20 He affirms not only the dignity of 
an individual, but also, bearing in mind the aforementioned Pope's stance on identity, the 
dignity of a nation giving it anthropomorphic traits, e.g., the search for truth: “Man remains 
above all a being who seeks the truth and strives to live in that truth… From this open search 
for truth, which is renewed in every generation, the culture of a nation derives its 
character.”21 Having ennobled the nation with a spirit and collectivity, the Pope claims that 
the message of the Gospel refers not only to an individual but also to nations: “… it is 
appropriate to recall that evangelization too plays a role in the culture of the various 
nations, sustaining culture in its progress towards the truth.”22 
The subject of action is not only an individual, although John Paul II sees him/her as 
supreme value. Because the individual is not abstract but concrete, the subject of history, the 
object of evangelization and an integral part of human identity is, according to the Pope, the 
culture of nation as the basis of a state, which is an integral part of people's right to self-
determination.    
           He sees the culture as possessing a kind of genius, development, a destiny, and a set of 
distinctive features. This view greatly resembles the romanticist notion of “folk spirit” 
(Volksgeist).23 In this context, a special attention should be paid to his book, Memory and 
Identity. Apart from the encyclicals, this book offers the best choice for studying the 
religious, cultural and national identity as espoused by the Polish Pope. 
In the chapter, “My Country: Native Land–Nation–State,” with the experience of Poland 
joining the EU in mind, the Pope formulates the following question: how does the joining of 
countries into a supranational unity reflect on “internal attitude highly regarded in Polish 
history–patriotism?”24 In order to arrive at the understanding of John Paul II's view on the 
relationship between Christian identity and the identity acquired in the state and the nation, 
we shall first look at some of the definitions of key concepts found in his work. 
                                                          
20 John Paul II, Centesimus annus, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html, §45. 
21 John Paul II, Centesimus, §49-50. 
22 John Paul II, Centesimus, 50. 
23 Dorian Llywelyn, Toward a Catholic Theology of Nationality (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 164. 
24 Ivan Pavao II, Sjećanje i identitet (Split: Verbum, 2005), 63. (English translation: John Paul II, Memory and 
Identity, Rizzoli, 2005). 
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Native land. Unlike state, native land has a spiritual, rather than just legal or technical 
meaning: “native land, heritage... as well as the situation resulting from the heritage,” and 
also “the concept of native land includes values and spiritual content which make a nation's 
culture.”25 But his definition also defines territory as a spiritual category: “a territory forcibly 
taken from a nation in a sense becomes a plea, a cry even, addressed to the spirit of the nation 
itself.”26 The spiritual values held by a nation and their territory form an unbreakable unity. 
The Pope founded these claims, strangely enough, on the Gospel itself, in which “Jesus' 
teachings contain deepest elements of theological vision of be it native land or culture.”27 
This is supported by Jesus' reference to the Father as the fundamental word by which that 
which is pertinent to culture and native land, i.e., the heritage, is conveyed. Nevertheless, 
Jesus' theological vision of native land, according to the Pope, is relatively unclear since on 
the one hand, he says that “the heritage given to us through Christ guides the native land 
inheritance and human culture towards the eternal Native land” whereas, shortly after, he 
goes on to say that “Christ's return to the Father inaugurates a new Native land into the 
history of all native lands and all people.”28 The dialectic between the eternal and temporary, 
where it is unclear if the Native land is built into native land or ultimately, native land is to be 
abolished in the Native land, appears to be one of the stumbling blocks in the Pope's analysis 
of the notion of native land. However, it seems that in further text, the Pope advocates the 
latter option by which, as we shall see, native land gains eschatological significance: 
“Without losing its temporal sense, the notion of native land was opened to dimensions of 
eschatology and eternity by Christ's ascension.”29 He supports this eschatological view of 
native land with many examples from Polish history where people sacrificed their lives on the 
altar of native land but with their hearts firmly set on their Native land in Heaven.  
Patriotism. When defining patriotism, the Pope claims that its root is to be found in 
the heritage received from the fathers. He takes the next theological step and bases patriotism 
on “the Fourth Commandment (which) obliges us to honor our father and mother.”30  
Moreover, in relation to native land, he introduces the notion of piety, pietas, as the founding 
element of the relationship towards “spiritual heritage kept for us by native land and passed 
on to us by our fathers and mothers.”31 Once again, he uses his native land as an example and 
                                                          
25 Ivan Pavao II, Sjećanje, 64. 
26 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 65. 
27 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 66. 
28 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 67. 
29 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 67. 
30 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 69. 
31 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 69. 
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says that Polish individualism and private interests “weaken the willingness for sacrifice in 
promoting the values and ideals that have to do with the concept of native land.”32 Native 
land is, like nation and biological family, “irreplaceable reality”, and with this claim the Pope 
identifies one's cultural affiliation with biological one. He also subjects the individual to the 
communal identity of the nation. This he finds to be a justification of “great sacrifice for 
protection of that good (native land)” as testified by “countless graves of soldiers who fought 
for Poland.”33 
Nation. In the process of biologization and spiritualization of native land and therefore 
patriotism, the Pope takes it a step further with his definition of nation which “is connected to 
birth.”34 The roots of this primordial35 notion of homeland and nation the Pope finds in the 
Catholic social doctrine where “the family and nation are natural societies,” and once again 
calls forth the Polish experience which supports his claim that natural societies “according to 
their nature, have an inclination to found themselves in the state.”36 The notion of state equals 
the notion of nation-state, where state is founded on one's affiliation with a people as ethnos 
since nation is “where a state is being born.”37 The basis for this claim the Pope finds not 
only in the Old Testament and God's election of Israel, but also, again, in the mystery of 
Incarnation which “belongs to the theology of nation.”38  The Incarnation, he goes on to say, 
is the beginning of the creation of a higher order, the order in which they are “born of God,” 
but which does not abolish the national identity but transforms it into eschaton in which “the 
history of all nations enters the history of salvation.”39 In order to move away from 
nationalism, the Pope claims that history of all nations enters the history of salvation by 
saying that nation has a historical rather than eternal meaning, and that in eschaton there will 
exist one, God's nation. On the other hand, he does not abstract the God's nation from the 
national identity of the eschaton inhabitants but argues that the eschaton is comprised of the 
totality not only of individuals “born out of Spirit” but also of their nations. The Pope claims 
that “people, and not nations, face God's judgment,” but because he takes a biologistic stance 
on nation he claims that “the judgment imposed on an individual somehow applies to nations 
                                                          
32 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 68. 
33 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 71, 70. 
34 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 72. 
35 On primordial understanding of nation see Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of 
Recent Theories of Nation and Nationalism (London and New York, Routledge, 1998), 146-152. 
36 Ivan Pavao II, Sjećanje i identitet, 72, 73. 
37 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 73. 
38 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 74. 
39 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 75. 
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as well.”40 According to him, it is not only the individuals that receive baptism but the 
salvation and transformation in the spirit of Christ extend to the nation itself. This can be seen 
in his thoughts on the baptism of the Poles which refers not only to the “sacrament of 
Christian initiation received by the first Polish sovereign,” but also to the “event crucial for 
the birth of a nation and formation of its Christian identity.”41 The nation and culture are 
Christianized by individuals who fundamentally belong to a nation so the Pope can establish 
the existence of Christian culture and civilization.  
 
2.2. Croatian Application of John Paul’s II Theology of the Nation 
John Paul II's biologistic approach to the question of nation, ethnic belonging, and 
culture found a fertile soil in Yugoslavia and other Eastern Europe states. It should be noted 
that the Pope's theory of nation was not simply translated in the context of Yugoslavian 
circumstances. In the 1970s in Croatia, the theology of Incarnation was the backdrop against 
which national, native land or ethnic affiliations were interpreted as theological categories. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, a number of national awakenings took place mainly in 
Croatia and Serbia. In this context, one of the most influential Croatian theologians in the last 
50 years, Tomislav Janko Šagi Bunić, a Capuchin, published a collection of essays on the 
national question and the Christian faith with a significant title The Catholic Church and the 
Croatian People.42 In it, Šagi Bunić insists that nationalism, defined in a “strong sense, i.e., 
as invasive, chauvinistic and exclusive,” cannot be related to Christian faith. “Such 
nationalism exists if a people wish to take others’ territory or goods or attempt to 
economically, culturally, politically, even nationally, subjugate others, abolish their national 
identity, absorb and alienate them.”43 With this definition of nationalism in a strong sense, 
Šagi paves a way for a positive view on nationalism proclaiming all form of non-nationalism 
to be patriotism. In his words, patriotism is, very simply, love towards native land, which 
“wishes to do no harm or injustice… but wishes and strives for the flourishing of its people in 
solidarity with other nations”44 comparing it to what he, along the lines of Pope Pius XII's 
thoughts, calls healthy nationalism. Šagi keeps placing people, and not the state, as the 
subject of interest to the Church, and breaks up with the tradition of aligning the Church with 
                                                          
40 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 78. 
41 Ivan Pavao, Sjećanje, 79. This is also obvious in his encyclical letter Laborem exercens where he greets the 
Christianization of the Slavic nations. Cf. Llywelyn, Toward Catholic, 162. 
42 Tomislav Janko Šagi Bunić, Katolička crkva i hrvatski narod (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1983). Although 
published in 1983, the collected texts in the book were written before John Paul II became the Pope. 
43 T. J. Šagi Bunić, „Kršćanstvo i nacionalizam,“ in Šagi, Katolička crkva, 13. 
44 Šagi, „Kršćanstvo,” 14. 
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the state order, which was very important for the Croatian context at the time. It is also 
important to note that the relationship with the state order was simply replaced by the 
relationship with a people. Native land is, in his opinion, a place where a people dwell and 
which fulfills them, the place suitable for “one's personal development.”45 It is like a mother 
because it is “truly like a mother's arms in which one grows safely.”46 
         Having defined native land and people47 as the only places of safe development for a 
person, one's talents and abilities, Šagi, entirely along the lines of Pope Wojtyla's thought, 
identifies people to be a theological category and perceives it as a sort of preparation for 
accepting God's calling. He thinks that the only way to answer God's calling is the one made 
in freedom and “freedom's maturity is found in native land.”48 Native land and people thus 
form kind of preconditions for being a Christian. In other words, it is by birth that one enters 
people, and so the affiliation with people, which forms one's core identity, is regarded as a 
crucial “testimony for God and Christ.”49  
        Uncommon to the then Croatian and Yugoslavian religious context is Šagi's belief, and 
he emphasizes it in a number of instances, that Croatian people are not solely defined by their 
affiliation with Christianity but that there are cultural, political, economic, and other elements 
that influence the formation of people. However, although Šagi never clearly and openly 
identifies Catholic faith and Croatian people, he is still caught in another trap when he 
identifies Christianity with affiliation to a particular people. It seems that he, even before 
John Paul II, made a claim that there can be no Christianity without a people, and in the case 
of Šagi's text, it is not seen as demos but as ethnos.50 A Christian is “with his heart and the 
whole of his being deeply rooted in his people,”51 and it is his role to enrich and ennoble his 
people with the Gospel in order to escape chauvinistic and exclusive nationalism. Although 
explicitly condemning nationalism, the identification of ethnically defined people and 
Christianity was a basis for further development of ideas. The Croatian nation-state, 
established in the 1990s, and Christianity are founded on people and their culture. 
                                                          
45 Šagi, „Kršćanstvo,” 15. 
46 Šagi, „Kršćanstvo,” 17. 
47 In this text, Šagi doesn't work through these two dimensions although at one point he states that homeland, 
nation and people are “different but mutually inter-connected concepts,”  14. 
48 Šagi, „Kršćanstvo,” 17. 
49 Šagi, „Kršćanstvo,” 19. 
50 Ethnos the identity politics based on blood ties,while in demos it is based on universal territorial citizenship. 
On these issues in the context of East Europe, see John Nagne, „Ethnos, Demos and Democratization: A 
Comparison of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland“, in Democratization, 4 (1997) 2, 28-56. 
51 Šagi, „Kršćanstvo,” 19. 
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In Croatia, the emphasis on incarnational nature of people and culture was soon turned 
to a program surpassing purely theological interests.  During the late 1980s turmoil, those 
interests were the means by which the Catholic Church, which “in its nature must be rooted 
in every particular people and every particular nation in order to be able to fulfill its mission,” 
must have “not only national but also national-political orientation.” 52 
The Church’s national-political orientation was mainly seen in the support it provided 
to all the means for the establishment of an independent state. These means were based on the 
idea of exclusive ethnic origin of people as well as strong emphasis on cultural 
distinctiveness with regards to the surrounding peoples. The ethnicization of Christ is 
reflected in the following thesis by Živko Kustić: “when one people, like us Croats, in their 
majority accept Christianity, then Jesus becomes the member of that people. With Christian 
conversion of Croats, Jesus became a Croat in a sense. When I received baptism, Jesus in me 
became a Croat.”53 Regardless of the Pope’s relativization of a people and its culture against 
what he called “heavenly homeland” which surpasses and encompasses all peoples and 
cultures, the ethnicization of both Christ’s and Church’s mission provided strong support to 
cultural and ethnic programs which regarded members of other peoples as the “other” not 
only in the sense of ethnicity, but also religion. This “otherness” called for significant 
revision of the history of peoples who shared heritage for centuries, at the same time 
abolishing the role of culture as a means of transcending ethnic borders and turning it into 
what Terry Eagleton, writing about the Balkans, describes as: “what you kill for.”54 The key 
theological concepts in a conflict, such as solidarity with victims, took the form of solidarity 
with one’s own victims or, in the words of a prominent Croatian priest in a publication 
funded by the Croatian Government: Croatia’s spiritual renewal consists of “solidarity 
towards the victims, those who have suffered and those who fought for the wounded 
Croatia.”  Showing solidarity only to one's own victims makes it a part of “overall Croatian 
unity and overall Croatian reconstruction.”55 
It is precisely in this that the paradox of Church and theology during the war years 
becomes clear. Croatian clergy, along with the Pope and theologians, did call for forgiveness, 
non-retaliation and reconciliation, but the ethnicization of the mission of the Church and the 
                                                          
52 Darko Hudelist, Rim, a ne Beograd: promjena doba i mirna ofenziva Katoličke Crkve u SFR Jugoslaviji 
1975.-1984.), [Rome, and not Belgrade: change of the ages and the peaceful offensive of the Catholic Church in 
SFR Yugoslavia] (Zagreb, Alfa, 2017), 236. 
53 Hudelist, Rim, 233. 
54 Terry Eagleton, The Idea of Culture (Oxford, Blackwell, 2000), 41. 
55 Anto Baković (ed.), Duhovna obnova Hrvatske [Spiritual Renewal of Croatia], (Zagreb: Vlada Republike 
Hrvatske-Agencija za obnovu, 1992), 39. 
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nature of peoples laid a foundation for the construction of the ethnic and religious “other.” 
During the war, this paradox provided a theological framework for the creation of the “other” 
based on ethnicity and religion. After the war, it resulted in silence towards the victims and 
the suffering of other peoples, as well as the rise of populist movements in the past couple of 
years.56 
 
2.2. Serbian Orthodoxy and Ethnonationalism 
2.2.1. Source: Saint Sava and Christian Nationalism 
Synecdoche is a class of metonymy where a part is taken to refer to the whole.57 In the 
case of the relationship between ethnonationalism and Serbian Orthodoxy, the synecdoche 
which defines the whole is the thought of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s Saint Nikolaj 
Velimirović. His thought is largely understood on the basis of his two major works, 
“Nationalism of Saint Sava” and “Words to the Serbian People through the Prison Window.” 
Nevertheless, in order to grasp the problem of nationalism in modern Serbian theology, one 
must take into account his essay “Serbian People as Theodulos.” In that book, Bishop 
Velimirović lays the groundwork for what is today considered to be one of the greatest 
controversies on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia—the so-called Saint Sava's nationalism. It 
represents the dominant concept governing the relationship of the institution of Serbian 
Orthodox Church towards socio-political movements.  
In his essay, “Serbian People as Theodulos,” Velimirović presents an organic view of 
nationalism, according to which he sees the Serbian people not as a plural, heterogeneous 
community in a modern, civil context, but as a single, homogeneous body whose essence is 
found in the Orthodox tradition.58 This unique, religious-national organ, in Velimirović's 
opinion, is formed according to the principles of so-called Christian nationalism on the basis 
of which the Serbian people are seen as theodulos.59 Christian nationalism, as espoused by 
Velimirović, does not entail discrimination of others, but is primarily oriented towards one's 
inner  life and living space in order for every Serb to form a clear idea of himself or herself as 
                                                          
56 See Zoran Grozdanov, „From Incarnation to Identity: The Theological Background of National-Populist 
Politics in the Western Balkans,” in Joshua Ralston and Ulrich Schmiedel, The Spirit of Populism: Political 
Theologies in Polarized Times (Leiden: Brill, 2021) (to be published).  
57 In his book Hrvati i crkva [Croats and the Church] (Zagreb-Sarajevo: Profil Knjiga-Svjetlo riječi, 2013), 94, 
Ivo Banac stated, for instance, that the synecdoche in the case of the Catholic Church in Croatia is the Ustaša 
regime, because this Church has never resisted the mentioned ideology in an adequate way. 
58 “Srpski narod kao teodul,“ in Nikolaj Velimirović, Sabrana dela - Knjiga V (Soko: Manastir Sv. Nikolaja, 
2016).; Cf. Branko Sekulić, “The Pretense Veil of Christian Vulgarism: The Phenomenon of Ethnoreligianity in 
the Contemporary Societies of the Former Yugoslavia" (PhD diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 2019), 
164–65. 
59 Velimirović, “Srpski,” §16; Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense,” 164–65. 
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being a theodulos. A theodulos is someone who serves God the way Christ did, primarily 
contributing to the prosperity of one's home and then attempting to spread the prosperity to 
other people (Völker) if they ask for it.60 According to Velimirović, it is only in such 
nationalism that the nationalism of a true Serb is witnessed because it is developed for the 
glory of Christ who is the basis of a theodulos state. 61 Theodulos as a means of serving God 
is taken to be the only path and purpose of both the Church and the state alike.62 In 
Velimirović's words, Serbs have advocated this belief for 800 years since the Serbian state 
was founded by Stefan Nemanja and given the breath of life by his son, Saint Sava. 63 “It is 
typical, so it seems, for Serbian medieval state and Serbian Orthodox Church, that both 
resulted from heroic deeds of a father and a son, two saints and two guides of Serbian 
national history.”64 Stefan Nemanja, also known by his ecclesial name of Saint Simeon the 
Myrrh-streaming, united warring tribes that lived in the area of Raška (present-day south-east 
Serbia) and successfully negotiated independence of that area with the Byzantine Empire in 
1168. In that way, he laid the foundations of that, which is in today's Serbian historiography, 
known as the predecessor of the Serbian state.65 Stefan Nemanja's son, Rastko Nemanjić, 
known by his church name of Saint Sava, laid the foundations of the present-day's Serbian 
Orthodox Church and was the first Serbian Archbishop. In 1219, he negotiated autocephaly 
with the Emperor of Constantinople and the Patriarch of Constantinople in the area which 
was previously set free from Byzantine rule by his father.66 With these facts in mind, it 
becomes clear that in Serbian Orthodox imagery, a state cannot be regarded as a politically 
abstract formation but it is necessarily something increasingly personal. 67 Christian 
nationalism is thus personalized and takes on a more intimate form of Saint Sava 
nationalism, which becomes the backbone and modus vivendi of Serbian Orthodoxy.68 
However, this shift from Christianity to Saint Sava nationalism, according to Bishop 
Velimirović, does not imply narrow-mindedness or chauvinism, because even though it is 
                                                          
60 Velimirović, “Srpski,“  §52, 83.; Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense,” 164–65. 
61 Velimirović, “Srpski,“ §16. Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense,” 164–65. 
62 See Velimirović, Srpski narod kao teodul [The Serbian People as a Theodule] (Beograd: Evro Book, 2001), § 
22.; Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense," 164–65. 
63 Velimirović, “Srpski,“ §2-6, 20; Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense,” 73. 
64 Đoko Slijepčević, Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve I [History of Serbian Orthodox Church] (Beograd: BIGZ, 
2002), 34. 
65 Sima M. Ćirković, Srbi među europskim narodima [Sr\erbs among European Peoples]  (Zagreb: Golden 
marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2008), 38–40.; Slijepčević, Istorija, 34–35.; Vladimir Čorović, Istorija srpskog 
naroda [Jistory of Serbian People], (Beograd: Janus, 2001), 110–11, https://www.rastko.rs/rastko-
bl/istorija/corovic/istorija/index_l.html.; Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense Veil," 73. 
66 See Ćirković, Srbi, 42–43.; Čorović, Istorija, 125.; Slijepčević, Istorija, 49–50. 
67 Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense," 164–65. 
68 Sekulić, “The Pretense," 164–65. 
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manifested through Saintsavaism (svetoslavlje) as Serbian and Orthodox, it is still universally 
Christian.69 “His nationalism is Christian Orthodox nationalism and his State is a theodulos 
state.”70 With that, Saintsavaism became a unique religious-national framework in the world 
history within which a true nature of Serbian Orthodox people can be generated. Velimirović 
found the existence of a national church to be the right of every people, but according to him, 
a national faith was inconceivable since every version of belief that would lead to the 
reduction of the universality of Christ's faith on the political and historical grounds of a 
people (Volk) would be seen as impious and unacceptable.71 In that sense, one should 
understand his controversial speech at the Kolarac People's University in 1935 when he drew 
a parallel between Saint Sava and Adolf Hitler. In that speech, he said that Adolf Hitler 
attempted to give Germans what Saint Sava gave Serbs—a national church.72 Along those 
lines, Velimirović makes a claim in his text, “National Church But Not National Faith,” that 
Hitler had every right to establish a German national church, but if that was to turn into a 
claim for the establishment of national faith, that would be both a heresy and a mistake.73 To 
call religious dogmas and religious truths national, for Velimirović, is equally dangerous and 
ridiculous.74 A church, on the other hand, Velimirović goes on to say, must be national, 
because it is a testimony of a commitment to a certain language, culture, and customs within 
which the spirit of the Gospel is manifested.75 In other words, Serbian Orthodoxy is true 
Christianity which reflects the essence of Serbian people.76 With this, in a paradoxical but 
also dangerous way, the idea of religion, state, and people is identified. This is also 
Velimirović's summary of Saintsavaism, which he defines as the Serbian-style Christianity 
and experience embodied in pious persons, mainly in the person of Saint Sava himself. 77  
 
2.2.2. Reception: Saint Sava and the Chetnik-Monarchist Movement 
                                                          
69 Velimirović, “Srpski,” §52; Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense," 164–65. 
70 Velimirović, “Srpski,“ §16.  
71 Velimirović, “Nacionalna crkva ali ne nacionalna vera,“ in Velimirović, Sabrana dela - Knjiga XIII 
[Collected Works--Book XIII]  (Soko: Manastir Sv. Nikolaja, 2016), 92.; Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense,” 167. 
72 Velimirović “Nacionalna,” 92; cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense,” 167. 
73 Velimirović, “Nacionalna,“ 92; cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense ," 168. 
74 Velimorović „Nacionalna,”, 93. 
75 Velimirović, „Nacionalna” 93; Thomas Bremer, Ekklesiale Struktur und Ekklesiologie in der Serbischen 
Orthodoxen Kirche im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag, 1992), 155–58.; Cf. Sekulić, 
“The Pretense," 167-168. 
76 See „Predgovor knjizi Svetosavlje kao filosofija života“, in Nikolaj Velimirović, Sabrana dela - Knjiga X  
(Soko: Manastir Sv. Nikolaja, 2016), 90.. 
77 Sekulić, “The Pretense," 167-168. 
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However, the understanding and reception of these seemingly acceptable theses about 
faith and nation led to some grave problems as manifested in the following two aspects: the 
first, as Thomas Bremer rightly noted, that Velimirović is primarily a pastor and not a 
theologian in the academic sense of the word;78 and the second aspect testifies to a close 
relationship between Velimirović and Dragoljub (Draža) Mihailović, the leader of the Četnik-
Monarchist movement.79 In the light of the first aspect, Velimirović's position on topics such 
as faith, people (Volk) or nation does not provide a clear vision of the position the Serbian 
Orthodox Church might occupy in the modern world.  His concepts of faith, people (Volk) or 
nation become supple forms used in manipulation of the Christian doctrine for political ends. 
This is best exemplified in the notion of Saintsavaism, originally a universal Christian idea 
based on the person and work of Saint Sava, which was then transformed into a synonym for 
Serbian radical ethnonationalist Četnik ideology.80 The responsibility for this transformation 
lies solely with the institution of the Serbian Orthodox Church which was, according to Jozo 
Tomasevich, as a national Church naturally inclined towards the affiliation with Draža 
Mihailović’s Chetnik movement.81 During the Second World War, the Četnik movement was 
supported by King Peter II of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
in Exile led by Serbs.82 On top of that, according to Radmila Radić, Mihailović's movement 
and the institution of the Serbian Orthodox Church shared the same views about practical 
political activities and the connection to the monarchy, and there are some indications of the 
Holy Synod financially supporting the movement throughout the WWII.83 The main idea was 
the creation of some sort of Serbian counterpart to the Byzantine symphony in which the 
Serbian Orthodox Church would be the social center of the Serbian Orthodox state of the 
monarchist type, and where General Mihailović was held to be the main actor in the 
realization of that goal. That should not come as a surprise since Draža Mihailović's Četnik 
movement was the official army of the Government of Yugoslavia in Exile and was named 
the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland or the Ravna Gora Movement.84 It was established as a 
form of resistance by a small group of Yugoslav Kingdom soldiers who, loyal to their King, 
                                                          
78 See Bremer, Ekklesiale, 115.; Cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense,” 164–65. 
79 Sekulić, “The Pretense,” 164–65. 
80 Sekulić, "The Pretense",  87, 171–77. 
81 Jozo Tomasevich, Četnici u drugom svjetskom ratu 1941-1945 [Četniks in WWII] (Zagreb: Sveučilišna 
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82 Tomasevich, Četnici, 163; cf. Sekulić, “The Pretense,” 80. 
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refused to surrender to German occupation forces in April 1941 after their own country was 
occupied.85 However, the fact that Mihailović's movement fought the Nazi occupation does 
not make it an anti-fascist movement as some present-day historical revisionists claim. It was, 
as Tomasevich says, a Yugoslavian membrane filled with ideas of Greater Serbia and 
directed towards the cleansing of ethnical and religious groups—Croats, Catholics, Bosniaks, 
and Muslims.86 With the leader of such movement Velimirović nurtured a close relationship, 
which was, according to Vladimir Dimitrijević, like that of a father and son.87 This, of course, 
left a permanent stain on Velimirović's name and sainthood. The magnitude of Velimirović's 
feelings for Mihailović can be seen in his posthumous speech (Homily on Draža) given in 
1954, nine years after Mihailović was convicted and executed for war crimes and 
collaboration with the occupation authorities. In that speech, Mihailović is given a certain 
form of holiness and piety, he is seen as a martyr, a theodulos and a guidepost to Serbian 
people and as unjustly sentenced.88 This relationship, as well as the sympathy of the Church 
structures towards Mihailović's movement, made the Chetniks, in a general sense, a backdrop 
against which Serbian Orthodoxy is viewed, especially since the institution of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church never really disputed it. In that sense, Velimirović became, nolens volens, 
the icon of that symbiosis.  
 
2.2.3. Consequences: Saint Sava and Contemporary Serbian Ethnonationalism 
Aware of the synecdoche of Velimirović for the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the 
burden that the idea of nation carries in Orthodox Churches in general, Radovan Bigović–a 
theologian whose thought can indisputably be taken as paradigmatic for the position of the 
institution of the Serbian Orthodox Church on this issue—starts his speech on this topic with 
a reference to the central position the unity of all humankind has in the Orthodox doctrine.89 
The unity takes place within the eschatological community which transcends all historical 
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differences and where the faithful become God's people.90 This belief made it possible for 
Orthodox theology to develop the concept of providential people, which is based on the idea 
of equal value of all people in the world because they all play an important role in God's plan 
of salvation and, according to that, their material and spiritual growth must not be impeded.91 
In Bigović's words, this is the key argument why Orthodox peoples refuse all kinds of socio 
political development which would lead to the loss of national awareness.92 Such 
development would mean the negation of Church unity manifested in diversity and diversity 
in unity in which every single nation (Volk) establish their own, earthly value system but in 
the spirit of the Gospel and with the ultimate goal of the realization of God's plan.93 In line 
with these ideas, Orthodox theology developed an ideal of church-state, a state that provides 
a people (Volk) with a system of secular values and a church which makes sure that the 
people (Volk) develop in the spirit of the Gospel.94 According to Bigović, this ideal was 
formed as a result of the experience of the Balkan Orthodox peoples ruled by the Ottomans.95 
In the Ottoman times, without their own state and due to legal regulations on the protection of 
minorities, the non-Muslim population started identifying with the Orthodox Church as the 
only institution which provided them with an opportunity to come in contact with their ethnic 
identity.96 This gradually led to strong intertwining of the Orthodox Church and certain 
people (Volk) and to the belief that Orthodoxy was one of the key factors in the formation of 
Balkan national states.97 However, as Bigović points out, this was taken to the extreme in 
countries where the idea of nation was placed before faith and where the Orthodox Church 
was used for nation's ends.98 This was condemned as a heresy of ethnophiletism in 
Constantinople on September 10, 1872. In that sense, Bigović adds, the Orthodox Church 
cannot be seen as national, non-national or super-national, but due to the variety of peoples 
(Völker) and nations it includes, it is undisputedly multinational in character.99 This is so, 
Bigović goes on to say, because the Orthodox Church is defined not by its nation, but by the 
territory it occupies.100 However, he emphasizes the fact that today, almost every local 
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92 Bigović, The Orthodox, 38. 
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95 Bigović, The Orthodox, 41. 
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Church is uniquely defined by its ethnic or national community.101  This puts a very serious 
question to Orthodox churches: whether to stick to the principle of territory or to affiliate 
exclusively to a nation?102 According to Bigović, this should not be regarded as an either-or 
issue since the church economy contains both of these concepts but in a way that none of 
them essentially define it.103 In this sense, Bigović quotes Velimirović himself who says that 
all nations can dwell under the common roof of the Church, but the Church cannot be 
comprised by one nation because the essence of the Church goes beyond worldly divisions.104 
         Nevertheless, although little fault can be found with this theoretical understanding of 
ethnonational aspect within Serbian Orthodoxy, in the practice the former question is seldom 
answered with an either-or attitude and more often from an and-and perspective. This points 
to the fact that the phenomenon of nation in Southeastern Europe is seen neither in the French 
Civil nor German Romantic sense, but in a purely post-Yugoslavian ethnonationalist sense. 
The institution of the Serbian Orthodox Church thus violated certain principles of Orthodoxy. 
Namely, during the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia, under the pretext of defending 
Serbianhood and Orthodoxy, the church structures supported pro-Serbian ethnonationalist 
agendas, whose aim was to unify all the areas on the territory of Yugoslavia with Serbian 
Orthodox population into a Serbian national state.105 This on the other hand is in accordance 
with the theory with the very popular Serbian Church Circles—the one which claims that all 
former Slavic Yugoslavian peoples have the same Serbian ethnic roots but, due to Islamic 
and Catholic proselytism, were cut from their matrix and now appear as separate ethnic 
communities.106 These views and aspirations, found on all levels of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, tell us how deeply the ethnonationalist ideology has permeated Serbian Church 
structures themselves. If we add the behavior of certain priest circles, whose views clearly 
evoked the historical memory of the closeness between the Church and the Četnik movement 
and whose ideology was often used as a blueprint for political activities, the problem is 
                                                          
101 According to Orthodox theology the local Church refers to the territorial identities and not to the church of a 
village or town. Thus, theoretically within Orthodoxy, the Church is organized on a territorial basis, but yet, in 
practice, those territorial aspects usually coincided with the place inhabited by certain ethnic identity such as 
Bulgarian, Greek, Russian, Serbian, and the like.  
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See for instance: Ivan Čolović, Smrt na Kosovu polju [Death on Kosovo Field], (Beograd: Biblioteka XX. vek, 
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[Saint Peter and Saint Sava], (Beograd: Biblioteka XX. vek, 2009), 110. 
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additionally, even radically, aggravated. Of course, this problem does not pertain to the 
overall corpus of the Orthodoxy of all Serbian cultural circles, but solely to its certain clerical 
structures. Therefore, facing this is the primary task of Serbian Orthodoxy if it wishes to get 
rid of the ideological burden of Saint Sava, who is reduced from a universal Christian saint to 
an icon of radical ethnonationalist circles under whose direction crimes of Vukovar, 
Škabrnja, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Drenica took place. It is for this reason that a 
constructive-critical confrontation with ideological constructs which resulted from 
Velimirović’s socio-political gibberish must take place. Without it, the appropriate de-
sacralization of the Serbian ethnonationalist agenda will not be possible, thus leaving space 




Reducing the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Serbian Orthodox Church to an 
ethnonationalist common denominator is simply not possible. They are way too 
heterogeneous within themselves for their church communities to be strictly labeled as 
ethnonationalist and such line of thought would simply imply analytical narrow-mindedness. 
However, it is impossible to ignore the consequences of sacralization of ethnonationalist 
agendas by the church structures. They were, and partly still are, too homogenous in their 
efforts of the aforementioned sacralization not to be recognized as such. To argue the 
opposite would reflect analytical blindness. We are left with facts and they point towards 
ethnonationalist coloring of the dominant theological discourse present in the Catholic 
Church in Croatia and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Within this discourse, Christian love 
towards one's neighbor is being filtered through the ideal of patriotism and redefined on 
ethnonationalist grounds. Thus, the inclusive nature of Christianity is reduced to a single 
ethnic community whereas patriotism ceases to be simply devotion to one's native land and 
people and becomes elimination of the “other.” The combination of these two concepts is 
best reflected in the policies of ethnic cleansings which took place during the 1990s on the 
territory of former Yugoslavia. These policies were partly enacted with the blessings from 
key Catholic and Orthodox Church figures respectively. This led to a kind of a paradox 
mirroring the inversion of God's plan. Namely, within God's plan, in the beginning, the Earth 
was empty and without form, whereas in the case of Croatian Catholicism and Serbian 
Orthodoxy as outlined in this paper, the emptiness is the ultimate goal. In that sense, Vukovar 
and Knin can be perceived as the holy toponyms of sacralized ethnonational discourse of 
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creation where God’s all-encompassing love, under direction of ethnonationalized Croatian 
Catholicism and Serbian Orthodoxy, is reduced to the members of respective ethnic groups, 
whereas the elimination of the “other” is the ultimate consequence of the sacralization of 
ethnonational discourse. 
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